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CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TAX MIX*
By BOB HAMILTON,** CHuN-YAN Kuo,***
AND SATYA N. PODDAR****
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade several countries have moved to reform
their tax systems substantially. While the central theme of the
reform initiatives has been to broaden the tax bases and to lower the
tax rates, they have also had a significant impact on the tax mix;
that is, the proportion of total tax revenues derived from various tax
sources. The United States and Australia recently introduced
reforms that would lower the personal tax burden and raise the
corporate tax burden. The United Kingdom has undergone two
significant tax reforms since the election of the Thatcher
govermnent, one of which increased sales tax revenue and reduced
personal tax revenue. New Zealand has introduced a value-added
tax to raise revenues, allowing a dramatic reduction in personal tax
revenues. More recently, Canada has proposed tax reforms designed
to lower the personal tax burden and increase the corporate and
sales tax burdens.
This paper reviews changes in the tax mix in Canada and
several other developed countries over the past two decades and
outlines the key factors that influence it. The tax mix is often
0 Copyright, 1988, Bob Hamilton, Chun-Yan Kuo, Satya N. Poddar.
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discussed in the context of a closed economy with pure taxes
(imposed on a comprehensive base in a non-distortionary manner),
and these arguments are reviewed here. However, in practice, tax
policy decisions are made in open economies and typically involve
very "impure" taxes. The paper illustrates that the ideal tax mix may
differ between the open economy and closed economy cases. In
particular, a small open economy such as Canada cannot ignore the
implications of the tax systems of its major trading partners. In
addition, the case for more reliance on a given tax suffers if that
tax is highly distortionary and inefficient.
This paper does not offer definitive conclusions for the
optimal tax mix in Canada. Rather, it presents a framework for
evaluating tax mix changes and illustrates how some of the
traditional arguments relating to the tax mix may be misleading. Nor
does the paper comment on the important issues surrounding the
overall level of taxation and the trade-off between tax and deficit
financing by governments. It focuses on reforms where the overall
tax revenues remain constant and only the relative share provided by
each source is altered.
The paper begins by illustrating the changes in the shares of
the important tax components in major oE countries since the 1960s.
Part III then discusses several reasons why we observe governments
using a variety of tax sources in virtually all developed countries.
Part IV analyzes the tax mix in a closed economy, focusing on the
major tax mix comparisons: personal versus corporate income tax,
and consumption versus income as the basis for taxation. Part V
discusses additional tax mix issues for an open economy, and
evaluates the potential impact of broad changes to the tax mix in
Canada.
II. BACKGROUND
A variety of economic factors and policy decisions have
influenced the tax mix in OEC countries back to the early 1960s.
Data on the tax mix for various OECD countries as of 1983
are presented in Table 1. In general, personal income tax (PIT) and
social security taxes are seen to be the dominant revenue sources,
followed by sales taxes, excise taxes and corporate income tax (CrT).
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There are, however, some significant deviations from these norms.
For instance, the social security tax share was only 3.9 percent in
Denmark, while the share of corporate income tax revenues in Japan
was more than double the OECD average.
The tax mix in Canada is approximately the same as the
OECD average, with two major exceptions. First, excise and other
taxes1 account for a larger percentage of revenues in Canada than
other OECD countries. Second, Canada's social security tax share is
well below the OECD average. The next two tables trace the changes
in these tax shares over the past two decades.
Table 1
Percentage Shares of Tax Revenues
Collected from Various Sources, 1983
(All Levels of Government)
Personal Corporate Consumption Social
Income Income Taxes Security Other
Tax Tax Sales Excises Taxes Levies Totals
Canada 35.6 7.5 11.6 14.4 13.1 17.8 100.0
U.S. 37.1 5.5 7.0 8.6 28.7 13.1 100.0
U.K. 27.7 10.8 13.9 14.2 17.7 15.7 100.0
Japan 25.6 19.6 0.0 13.2 30.0 11.6 100.0
France 13.4 4.3 20.5 7.7 43.9 10.2 100.0
West Germany 28.3 5.1 17.0 9.4 35.7 4.5 100.0
Italy 27.9 9.3 14.9 9.9 35.9 2.1 100.0
Sweden 38.9 3.4 13.6 9.7 26.9 7.5 100.0
Denmark 52.0 3.0 21.1 13.3 3.9 6.7 100.0
Netherlands 21.3 6.1 14.8 7.2 45.0 5.6 100.0
OECD Average 32.3 7.4 13.6 14.5 24.1 8.1 100.0
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics of OECD
Member Countries, 1965-84 (Paris: OECD, 1984).
1 These consist primarily of provincial licence fees and provincial resource royalties.
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Table 2
Percentage Shares of Tax Revenue Collected
From Various Sources in OECD Countries, 1965-83
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Personal 26.3 28.2 31.4 33.1 32.3
Corporate 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.7 7.4
Sales 11.7 13.1 12.7 13.6 13.6
Excise 23.2 19.7 15.5 13.9 14.5
Social Security 18.2 19.8 23.7 23.8 24.2
Other 11.4 10.2 9.0 7.9 8.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Organzation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics of OECD
Member Countries, 1965-84 (Paris: OECD, 1984).
Table 3
Percentage Shares of Revenue
Collected from Various Sources in Canada, 1965-83
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Personal 23.0 32.4 33.0 34.1 35.6
Corporate- 15.1 11.3 13.7 11.6 7.5
Sales 18.2 14.4 12.5 11.5 11.6
Excise 17.1 13.2 13.6 13.0 14.4
Social Security 5.7 9.6 10.1 10.4 13.1
Other 20.9 19.1 17.1 19.4 17.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics of OECD
Member Countries, 1965-84 (Paris: OECD, 1984).
The broad tax-mix changes for OECD countries over the
1965-1983 period are presented in Table 2 and can be summarized
as follows:
1. an increase in the share of personal income and social security
taxes;
2. a decline in the corporate income tax share;
3. a slight increase in the sales tax share; and
4. a marked decline in the share of excise levies and other taxes.
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In Canada, similar trends were observed (see Table 3). The
major deviations from the general trend were the sharp decline in
sales tax revenue share and the persistently much smaller share of
social security taxes, although social security tax revenues grew
sharply over this period.
Several key factors appear to have contributed to the
empirical evidence outlined above. Tax policies are not designed in
isolation and, as such, tend to reflect the general economic
conditions and the social and political environment. The 1960s was
a decade of generally favourable economic conditions: high growth,
low unemployment, and modest inflation. There was little pressure
on governments to introduce or enrich industrial subsidies, or to
provide selective tax incentives for savings and investments. As a
result, corporate and personal income tax systems continued to pro-
vide a stable source of revenues. The share of personal income tax
increased steadily over this period as the higher growth in average
personal incomes pushed individuals into higher rate brackets.
This period also witnessed a significant expansion in the
social security system, reflecting, in part, the increased focus on
achieving a fairer distribution of wealth. This led to an increase in
overall government expenditures for most OECD countries. These
expenditures were financed either by increases in direct social
security contributions or through the automatic increases in the
personal income tax generated by the economic growth (the fiscal
dividend). Thus, the share of both of these sources increased during
this period.
In the 1970s, the broad economic picture turned into one of
slower real growth, increased inflation, and increased unemployment.
The high inflation produced natural increases in personal, sales, and
corporate taxes. Government spending also continued to increase,
partially in response to these factors. The recognition of inflationary
biases in the corporate income tax led to a series of fiscal initiatives.
The early 1970s saw the introduction of investment tax credits,
accelerated capital cost allowances, inventory allowances, and other
inflation-correcting measures in several countries.2 These measures
2For example, the introduction of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) in the United
States in 1971.
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were also designed, in part, to respond to concerns about declining
productivity and growth. These incentives produced revenue losses
that, in many instances, more than offset the increase in revenues as
a result of increasing nominal corporate profits due to inflation.
The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GArr) also
appears to have influenced tax policies over this period. This
agreement severely limited the use of tariffs as a tool for industrial
and commercial policy, and prompted an ever-increasing use of the
corporate tax systems to provide targeted assistance to slow-growth
industries and regions in a country. The DISC provision in the
United States, the lower corporate tax rate for the manufacturing
and processing profits and the regionally differentiated investment
tax credits in Canada are examples of this phenomenon.
The net result of these initiatives was a period of declining
corporate tax revenues. By the end of the 1970s, corporate tax
revenues had stabilized again in many countries. For the OECD as
a whole, corporate tax revenues declined between 1970 and 1975,
then changed very little until the 1980s. The corporate tax share in
Canada declined from over 15 percent to about 11-12 percent, and
stabilized at that level throughout the 1970s.
3
General sales tax revenues as a fraction of total revenues
declined slightly between 1970 and 1975 (Table 4). The OECD
average dropped from 13.1 to 12.7 percent in this period. However,
as a fraction of gross domestic product, the sales tax revenues rose
slightly from 4.2 to 4.6 percent. This suggests that sales tax revenues
kept pace with economic growth, but the increased reliance on direct
taxes reduced the relative share of sales taxes.
In Canada, sales tax revenues dropped sharply from 18.2
percent in 1965 to 12.5 percent in 1975 (see Table 4). During this
period federal sales tax was removed from a number of commodities,
such as clothing, footwear, and candy and confectionery. This was
seen at the time as an effective way of providing stimulus to
consumer demand without adding to inflationary pressures in the
economy. These tax cuts were facilitated by strong growth in the
3 A temporary 10 percent surtax in 1974 and 1975 boosted the corporate tax revenue
share to 13.7 percent in 1975.
264 [VOL. 26 No. 2
Considerations for the Tax Mix
personal income tax revenues fesulting from higher inflation rates
and the lack of any indexing mechanism.
The share of other consumption taxes also declined
significantly between 1965-1975 in Canada as well as other OECD
countries. These taxes consist largely of specific excise levies, and
their values were eroded by inflation over this period.
The overall tax mix for the OECD countries changed little
over the 1975-1983 period. There were slight increases in the
shares of personal income tax and sales tax, and slight decreases in
the shares of other consumption taxes and other tax revenues. In
Canada, however, the share of corporate tax revenues decreased
further to less than 10 percent over this period, due in part to the
severity of the 1981-82 economic recession and in part to the
cumulation of excess, unused depreciation allowances, tax credits and
other investment incentives.
In summary, the economic prosperity of the 1960s, and the
high inflation and expansion of the social security system in the
1970s, combined to produce tax systems where personal and social
security taxes dominated, corporate taxes declined, and consumption
taxes remained stable.
Table 4
Percentage Shares of Tax Revenue
Collected from General Sales Taxes, 1965-83
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Canada 18.2 14.4 12.5 11.5 11.6
U.S. 4.6 5.6 6.7 6.6 7.0
U.K. 5.9 6.5 8.8 14.4 13.9
Japan - - - - -
France 23.2 25.5 23.3 21.0 20.5
WestGermany 16.5 17.1 14.6 16.6 17.0
Italy 12.9 13.2 14.3 16.3 14.9
Sweden 10.4 10.3 12.0 13.4 13.6
Denmark 9.1 18.8 16.9 22.2 21.1
Netherlands 12.4 14.6 14.4 15.9 14.8
OECD Average 11.7 13.1 12.7 13.6 13.6
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics of OECD
Member Countries, 1965-84 (Paris: OECD, 1984).
The 1980s, by contrast, have seen economic hardships and large
government deficits, and have forced governments to re-evaluate
1988]
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their tax systems. The focus has swung towards designing an
efficient tax system with lower rates, a broader base and fewer
selective preferences. The significant increases in the share of direct
personal taxes that have occurred over the past two decades have
also led to increased interest in the tax-mix issue and in methods of
lowering the personal tax burden.
Ill. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TAX MIX
Virtually all countries generate revenue through a variety of
tax sources. However, the relative importance of the various
components in a country's tax system varies significantly across
countries. This Part identifies a number of factors that impinge on
the choice of an optimal tax mix, and provides an explanation for
why multiple tax sources are observed in all countries.
A Ease of Compliance and Administration
Ease of compliance and administration is clearly an important
consideration in the choice of tax mix. The use of a personal or
corporate income tax, for example, demands a certain level of
sophistication among not only the bureaucracy, but also among the
taxpayers themselves. These forms of taxation require the use and
maintenance of proper books of account and well-developed
procedures for the recording and invoicing of transactions. These
requirements are often not met in developing countries, and it is for
this reason that these countries tend to rely more on tariffs and
excise levies on manufacturers, which are simpler to administer and
comply with. In fact, it has been suggested elsewhere 4 that an index
of the level of development in a country could be the extent to
which it relies on income taxes. For example, in the United States
tariffs accounted for over 55 percent of government revenue in 1885;
whereas they currently account for less than 1 percent of revenues.
4 H.H. Hinrichs, A General 77zeory of Tax Structure Change During Economic Development
(Cambridge: The Law School of Harvard University, 1966).
266 [VOL. 26 No. 2
Considerations for the Tax Mix
B. Multiple Objectives
The tax system is often asked to simultaneously perform
several functions: raise revenue, distribute the revenue burden
according to particular social values, provide incentives for certain
economic activities or regions, extract revenue from foreigners and
assist in achieving other policy objectives such as international trade
policy. One would not expect a single tax to be able to handle all
of these functions optimally. Rather, different objectives of the tax
system are often best handled by different taxes.
For example, the personal tax is often seen as the major
redistributive tax in the system, yet it is ineffective in achieving fiscal
objectives such as regional incentives or particular investment
incentives. Conversely, though the sales tax is often seen as an
efficient, simple revenue raiser, sole reliance on it would produce an
incidence pattern most governments would shy away from.
In other social, political, and economic factors there are also
large differences between countries that we would certainly expect
to lead to the use of different tax systems. This also explains the
substantial variance in the tax mix across countries, despite the
strong pressures for harmonization of tax policies.
C. Marginal Excess Burdens
The marginal excess burden (MEB) of a tax is the efficiency
cost of raising an additional dollar of revenue from that particular
tax source. Since the efficiency cost of a tax increases by the square
of the tax rate, as a tax rate is increased the MEB of that tax
becomes higher and, more important, may become higher than the
MEB of an alternative tax. From an efficiency standpoint, additional
government revenues should be raised from the tax with the lowest
MEB. Recent work for the United States5 shows that the MEB for
the overall tax system is about 33¢ per dollar of tax revenue raised.
The MEBS for the various tax sources, per dollar of tax revenue, are
31.4o for personal tax, 46.3¢ for capital taxes and 38.8o for sales
5 C.L. Ballard, J.B. Shoven & . Whalley, "General Equilibrium Computations of the
Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States" (1985) 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 128.
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taxes. Although these estimates are sensitive to parameter values
and vary from country to country, for this best-guess scenario we see
that the personal tax is the most efficient and that capital taxes are
the least efficient revenue sources.
Gillespie 6 offers a somewhat similar argument in a political
context. ie postulates that governments equate the marginal
political costs and marginal political benefits of raising revenues
through the various taxes. The equilibrium is where all taxes have
equal marginal political costs. These political costs could arise from
economic costs, but are also intended to capture the political
component of tax reform.
D. Stability of Revenues
Stability of revenues is also a consideration in designing a tax
system, and there are a couple of reasons why a variety of tax
sources could produce more stable government revenues. During
business cycles, a mix of taxes will provide greater revenue stability
than reliance on a single tax. A period of declining corporate
profits, for example, could produce less corporate tax revenue but
more personal tax or sales tax revenues. If government expenditures
are relatively constant, stability of revenues is essential.
In addition, the risk of evasion or avoidance of any particular
tax makes it desirable to have a portfolio of tax sources, the idea
being that someone is less likely to be able to escape all taxes. For
example, if an individual is able to escape taxation on income, he or
she may still be liable for some tax indirectly if there is a broad-
based sales tax.
E. Level of Taxing Jurisdiction
In a federal system, particular taxes are better suited to
particular levels of government, although there is often substantial
overlap. This places constraints on the tax mix for any particular
level of government. Two key factors that may determine taxes used
6 W.I. Gillespie, 'Tax Reform: The Battlefield, The Strategies, The Spoils" (1983) Can.
Pub. Admin. 182.
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by particular governments are the degree to which the taxes paid are
related to the benefits provided and the mobility of factors.
For pure public goods, such as national defence, where the
benefits accrue to all individuals equally, a tax based on the ability
to pay (that is, an income tax) seems appropriate. In other cases,
however, the benefit principle may be more appropriate. For
instance, municipal services, the benefits of which are closely related
to property values, could be financed through a property tax.
Indeed, it has been argued that local governments should
concentrate solely on "benefit-related" taxes, leaving income and
consumption taxes to higher levels of government.
7
This argument can be carried further, to suggest that
consumption taxes may be most appropriate to finance consumption-
related government benefits like medical services and education. In
Canada the provincial governments are largely responsible for these
services. Relating taxes to the nature of the benefits they finance
may suggest natural divisions in tax sources, with property taxes
appropriate for the lowest levels of government and income taxes
appropriate for the highest levels.
If factors (capital, labour) are completely mobile across
regions within a country, then a region will find it difficult to
increase its tax on a particular factor above the level of other
regions. Dramatic differences in personal income tax burdens
between regions can certainly contribute to labour movements into
or out of that region. These mobility considerations are important
in the taxation of capital, which is the most mobile of all factors of
production. This suggests that taxes on mobile factors be left to the
central government as much as possible. This argument has parallels
in an international context, as we will see later.
Lower levels of government that use sales taxes also have to
worry about driving out purchasers to surrounding jurisdictions. In
Canada we see this, in a limited manner, in cities which lie near
provincial borders. Certainly if municipalities were to impose sales
taxes, this type of inter-jurisdictional shopping would reduce the tax
7 C.E. McLure, "Comments" in J.A. Pechman, ed., Comprehensive Income Tax
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977).
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base of high-tax areas. Again, this has parallels in the international
context.
IV. THE TAX MIX IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
This Part discusses the relative merits of the major tax
sources in an attempt to understand the economic rationale behind
using these taxes. We focus on choices between income and
consumption taxes and between personal and corporate income
taxes, revisiting some of the standard tax mix arguments and
providing several interesting extensions.
It seems crucial to distinguish between discussions of pure
and impure taxes. Discussing pure tax systems allows us to distill the
key characteristics without becoming bogged down in practical
details. However, actual tax systems are often composed of quite
impure taxes, and the economic effects of actual taxes could be
significantly different from the effects of their pure counterparts.
For instance, a pure personal income tax would distort savings,
whereas the personal income tax in Canada contains many relieving
provisions for savings and investment income, and its impact is
significantly different from that of a pure income tax.
Similarly, the federal manufacturers' sales tax in Canada is
generally believed to be highly distortionary and inefficient. Even
the staunch proponents of consumption taxes would shy away from
recommending increased reliance on a sales tax of this form. Until
this tax is made more efficient, an increase in reliance on sales taxes
and reduction in personal taxes could be bad for Canada. With a
reformed sales tax, however, the effects could become positive.
A. Equivalences in Taxation
It may be useful here to outline some equivalences between
various types of taxes to illustrate that often different tax sources
can be used to tax the same base in a different way. This suggests
that the effects of differences in tax mix between countries can, in
some instances, be more perceived than real.
The equivalences that are described below require certain
restrictive assumptions: that the economy is closed, that there are
[VOL. 26 NO. 2270
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perfect capital markets, that there is only one level of government,
that the tax is comprehensive and has a uniform rate, and that there
are no bequests and inheritances.
The most basic equivalence is between a value-added
consumption tax and a retail sales tax. This simply states that the
retail price of a good is the sum of all values added in production.
These are also equivalent to a pure profits tax8 plus a payroll tax,
since a value-added tax has two components: a tax on wages and a
tax on pure profits (or economic rents). In fact, if pure profits are
equal to zero, then a consumption tax is equivalent to a payroll tax.
9
Finally, we see that a personal expenditure tax is equivalent to a
,sales tax, since these are merely two ways of taxing consumption.
Several interesting points can be made about tax mixes once
these equivalences are recognized. In the absence of pure profits,
a country can substitute a payroll tax (such as social security
contributions) for a sales tax, since their economic effects will be
equivalent. If pure profits are non-zero, then a cash-flow corporate
tax (a tax on corporate profits computed by allowing a full and
immediate deduction for depreciables and inventories but no
deduction for interest or dividends) may be required to maintain the
equivalence. This suggests that some of the observed differences in
tax mixes may be due simply to different countries using different
methods to tax the same base.
Reforms in Canada have moved the personal income tax
partially towards an expenditure tax by virtue of the exemptions
given to savings and investment income (pension contribution
deductions, $1,000 investment income deduction, capital gains
exemption). This suggests that replacing some personal tax revenues
with a value-added tax may have only limited aggregate economic
effect. This illustrates the basic point that in a comparison of tax
sources the differences between countries may not be as dramatic as
they seem.
8pure profits are defined as profits over and above the normal rate of return on capital
employed.
9This well-known equivalence is illustrated in ANB. Atkinson and l.E. Stiglitz, Lectures on
Public Economics (London: McGraw-Hill, 1980).
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The equivalences noted above are dramatically altered once
we move away from the restrictive assumptions on which they are
based. The closed economy assumption is perhaps the most
significant. With no international trade in goods or factors of
production, taxes on consumption can be shown to be similar to
taxes on factor incomes (for example, on payroll or profits).
However, in an open economy this is no longer true. Consumption
taxes are traditionally applied on a destination basis (that is, they
apply to imports but not to exports), while taxes on factor incomes
are applied on the basis of origin (that is, where the incomes are
earned). Their impact on trade patterns and factor movements is
thus likely to be quite different in an open economy.
B. Consumption Versus Income Taxes
Along with the income taxes, most developed countries
employ some form of general sales tax at the retail level, either of
the value-added type or a retail sales tax. Canada and the United
States are two notable exceptions to this rule. In Canada, the
provincial governments impose retail sales taxes but the federal
government has a sales tax applied at the manufacturers' level. The
U.S. federal government has no national sales tax, although many
states do have retail sales taxes. Over the past two decades many
countries, especially in Europe, have moved to a value-added tax.
These often replaced existing gross turnover taxes or relatively
narrowly-based sales taxes.
10
There has been considerable debate and discussion among
economists about the relative merits of income and consumption
taxes. Although the arguments in favour of consumption (or
expenditure) taxation have a long history,11 two fairly recent
documents have had a great deal of impact on the consumption
10As a prerequisite to joining the European Economic Community, countries are required
under the 6th Directive to implement a VAT.
"!See, for instance, N. Kalder, An Expenditure Tax (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1955).
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versus income tax debate. The Meade Report (1978)12 and the
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977)13 both articulated the
arguments in favour of consumption taxes clearly and forcefully.
Although they did not have an immediate effect on policy reforms,
they have certainly been catalysts for a noticeable shift among some
public finance economists and policy-makers towards consumption
taxes.
In a closed economy context, the main arguments in favour
of consumption taxes include inter-temporal efficiency and admin-
istrative simplicity. Let us examine them in turn.
Taxes which do not distort decisions regarding the level of
savings and investment are said to be inter-temporally efficient.
Sales taxes are inter-temporally efficient because they only tax
current consumption; the income return from savings is not taxed
until it is spent. Therefore individuals' savings decisions would not
be affected by a pure sales tax. Inter-temporal efficiency could be
a reason for replacing a pure income tax with a pure sales tax, but
in practice the argument may be less than compelling. First, if the
income tax is taxing capital income at a reduced rate, then the
reform may not alter the inter-temporal distortion significantly.
Second, any gains in inter-temporal efficiency may be offset
by its adverse impact on the labour-leisure choice. The pure
income tax base differs from the pure consumption tax base only to
the extent that there are savings. If there are positive savings, the
income tax base becomes broader and a lower rate is needed to
raise equal revenue, producing less distortion to the labour-leisure
choice. In this sense the personal tax is more efficient than the
sales tax.
Administratively, income taxes are very difficult to run in
their purest form. In fact, a key argument in favour of consumption
taxes over income taxes is that correct measurement of income is
very difficult due to adjustments required for inflation, depreciation,
and accrued but unrealized amounts of income. These adjustments
1 2 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure of Reform of Direct Taxation (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1978) (Chair. J.E. Meade) [hereinafter Meade Report].
13 United States Department of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).
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for correct measurement of income are essential at both the
corporate and personal levels. In each case the method to be used
in applying the tax is clear, but it is either too complex or the
information necessary is not readily available. A consumption tax,
on the other hand, is typically run on a cash-flow basis allowing
immediate expensing of capital purchases. Therefore, the
consumption tax is neutral with respect to inflation, and depreciation
schedules are unnecessary.
In addition, sales taxes are typically collected in smaller
pieces, whereas the income tax is collected in large sums. This
makes the income tax somewhat more visible, reduces the risk of
and effects of tax evasion, and may also reduce pressures for the
introduction of selective tax preferences.
The major criticism of sales or consumption taxes is their
regressive nature. Since lower-income households consume a larger
fraction of their income than higher-income households, consumption
taxes tax a larger percentage of the income of lower-income
households. This argument is correct in annual terms, but is very
misleading if we consider a longer time horizon. Considered over a
lifetime, a comprehensive, uniform rate sales tax can be viewed as
equivalent to a wage tax, and is seen as a proportional tax on all
income groups. In essence, savings do not escape taxation; rather,
taxation is delayed until the income is used to consume goods and
services. This implies that sales taxes are not regressive, but
proportional across income groups, especially for those who leave
limited bequests.
14
One can go even further and assert that sales taxes are
progressive, at least at low-income levels. The argument is that low-
income households receive a relatively large share of their income
in the form of transfer payments, which are typically indexed (at
least partially) to changes in the general price level. Therefore,
low-income households are largely insulated against sales tax
'.B. Davies, F. St-Hilaire, & J. Whalley, "Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax Incidence"
(1984) 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 633.
15E.K. Browning, The Burden of Taxation" (1978) 86 3. Pol. Econ. 649-71.
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Notwithstanding these arguments, a personal income tax
provides much greater flexibility than a sales tax in achieving a
progressive distribution of tax burden. The personal income tax is
an indispensable component of the tax system if that system is to
serve the objective of redistribution of income. This rationale for a
personal income tax is, however, often misinterpreted to suggest that
even a partial shift from a personal tax to sales tax is regressive or
otherwise burdensome to lower-income households. The invalidity
of such an assertion can be illustrated with the help of an example.
Consider a simple change where all households in Canada are
provided a refundable personal income tax cut of $100, and the
resulting revenue loss is made up by an appropriate, uniform,
percentage sales tax on all goods and services. The net impact of
such a change in revenue mix would be highly progressive across all
income ranges. The increase in the sales tax burden for the lower-
income families would be much less than the $100 decrease in their
personal income tax. In Canada, for example, households below
$25,000 (in 1982 dollars) of income would account for one-half of
the total personal tax cut, but bear only about one-third of the total
sales tax increase. It is thus misleading to suggest that a change in
tax mix with greater reliance on sales taxes is necessarily regressive.
One interesting question is whether the consumption tax
should take the form of a personal expenditure tax or a sales tax.
The former is calculated annually by taking the aggregate of an
individual's income and subtracting his or her savings during the
year. The latter is collected and remitted by businesses as they
provide goods and services to consumers, with no need for any
calculation of incomes or savings. Administratively, a sales tax is
much simpler than an expenditure tax. It involves fewer taxpayers
(only business firms as opposed to all households) and simpler
procedures for audits and assessments. A personal expenditure tax,
on the other hand, involves all of the complexities of an income tax
(such as definition of income, reporting of income, tax deductions at
source, and depreciation schedules) and additional complexities
related to definition and measurement of savings. The only
advantage of personal expenditure tax is that it can be imposed at
progressive tax rates.
Much of the discussion above relates to a choice between a
pure consumption tax and a pure income tax. In Canada, however,
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both of our personal income tax and sales tax systems are impure.
The personal income tax contains many relieving provisions for
savings and investment income. The sales tax system does not apply
to a range of goods and services and is highly distortionary in its
impact where it does apply.
Such hybrid and impure systems often result in the worst
outcome. It has been suggested elsewhere16 that the largest gains
in efficiency may come from moving to either a pure income or pure
consumption tax; the difference between the two is less important.
C. The Income Tax Mix: Personal Versus Corporate
The income tax systems in all developed countries apply the
tax to both individuals (or households) and corporations. While
personal income taxes have generally been accepted as integral parts
of a tax system due to their distributional characteristics, the
rationale for the corporate tax has been a source of debate for a
number of years. The corporate tax is seen in its ideal form as a
withholding tax and, more recently, as a method of taxing the pure
profits of firms.
In this context, it is useful to distinguish between a classical
system and an imputation system. Recognizing that corporate profits
are taxed at the corporate level and then again when they are
distributed to shareholders, various systems, referred to as imputation
systems, have been used to provide a credit to individuals for taxes
already paid at corporate level to avoid double taxation of corporate
profits. A system that takes no account of this double taxation is
referred to as a classical system.
Canada's corporate tax is closer to an imputation system in
that there is a high degree of integration between the personal and
corporate taxes by virtue of the dividend tax credit (and also partial
inclusion of share-capital gains in income). The United States, on
the other hand, has a classical system with no dividend tax credit or
other form of relief to shareholders for the corporate income tax.
1 6B. Hamilton & . Whalley, ' Border Adjustments and US Trade" (1986) 20 J. Int'l Econ.
377-83.
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paid by individuals. Corporations may submit the cheques, but the
higher prices of their output, or lower returns to shareholders or
workers, reflect the ultimate burden of the tax. As such, it has been
argued that the corporate tax is at best unnecessary except as a
withholding tax, and at worst a severe penalty to capital income.
There are two possible counter-arguments to this view. First,
the corporate tax may be one method of extracting benefits that are
provided to corporations by the government. Second, the corporate
decision-making process may be such that these corporations are
properly viewed as distinct entities. That is, are corporations best
thought of as merely a group of shareholders, or are they more
properly viewed as separate entities, and taxed accordingly? In the
absence of a one-to-one correspondence between the well-being of
the corporations and their shareholders, a case could be made for
the classical system.
The degree of integration between the corporate and
personal tax clearly has implications for the tax mix. In a closed
economy with full integration, the corporate tax share is irrelevant
as it is merely a withholding mechanism for the personal tax. Any
discussion of the mix between corporate and personal tax is
therefore meaningful only under a system with less than full
integration. Under a pure imputation system, the rate of corporate
tax is set by reference to the rate applicable to individual
shareholders, and the overall share of corporate tax depends upon
the share of corporate profits in the national income.
The revenue mix can still be subject to policy discretion if
the tax system is not pure; that is, if there are provisions that favour
certain types of income, investments, activities or groups of taxpayers
over others. For example, governments can reduce or increase the
overall share of corporate tax by providing more or fewer incentives
to businesses relative to employees or individuals with portfolio
investments. In many ways, the public debates about revenue mix
in Canada, as well as abroad, are directed not so much at the
balance between corporate and personal tax, but at the balance in
the taxation of income from business and non-business sources. It
is likely the case that in most countries the revenue yield of the
corporate tax, even as a pure withholding tax, would be substantially
higher were it to be applied on a comprehensive base with no
selective investment incentives.
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This, indeed, is the primary thrust of tax reform initiatives in
the United States and Canada, as well as other industrialized
countries. It does not appear that any country is moving closer to
either of the two types of corporate tax systems as outlined above.
Rather, they are trying to modify their existing systems, which are
usually riddled with special preferences and high marginal rates. The
general trend is toward increased effective tax rates through reduced
statutory rates and broadened bases, with more uniform application
across sectors and different types of investments.
While there are no clear conceptual arguments for the
imposition of an unintegrated corporate tax in a closed-economy
context, the Meade Report suggested that the corporate tax could be
designed in a classical system to capture the pure profits of
corporations. By capturing only the pure profits of firms, the
corporate tax would not affect the investment decisions of firms at
all and would thus be an efficient tax. While a strong argument
could be made for increasing the share of such a tax in the tax mix,
the revenue potential of such a tax would be extremely limited
because of its small base. In fact, under perfectly competitive
market conditions, the pure profits would be close to zero.
Beyond these basic tax mix questions, we now briefly discuss
the role of social security taxes and excise taxes in tax mix in a
closed economy.
D. Social Security Taxes
Some would argue that social security contributions are not
taxes at all and should be excluded from analysis of tax systems.
While this may be true of systems that are essentially insurance
schemes, it is not true of most current social security systems. If a
social security system is essentially an insurance fund whereby a
household contributes as its members work and then while retired
withdraws the entire amount, including interest built up, then the
contributions should not be considered a tax. However, in practice
these schemes appear to be more akin to a transfer from one
segment of the population (working) to another (retired); they are
clearly very similar to a tax. The case is strengthened if the
programme is not fully funded and must be supplemented by general
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revenues. It is probably most constructive to think of social security
contributions as payroll taxes.
In Canada the major contributory social security programmes
are the Canada and the Quebec pension plans, the unemployment
insurance programme, hospital and medical insurance, and workers'
compensation. These programmes are financed from either tax-like
payroll deductions or general revenues or both.
If social security taxes are viewed as payroll taxes, then our
earlier discussion suggests an equivalence between the steady-state
effects of social security and sales taxes, as both, in their purest
form, are equivalent to a tax on wages. This might suggest that a
comparison could be made between high sales tax countries and high
social security tax countries to see if these sources were being
substituted for each other. However, this equivalency rests on some
very strict assumptions. In practice, social security taxes often have
exemptions and ceilings, and sales taxes often have multiple rates
and are somewhat less than comprehensive. Under these conditions,
the effects of the two taxes are likely to be quite different.
Social security systems that are effectively transfers from
working to retired cohorts can influence the level of savings in an
economy. Feldstein17 argues that the U.S. social security system
caused individuals to reduce their savings by about 30 percent. This
effect, however, arises from the availability of social security benefits,
and not from the method of financing those benefits. There is no
reason to believe that the impact on savings of a social security
system financed by a payroll tax would be any different than one
financed by a sales tax.
It has been suggested that payroll taxes distort the
capital-labour ratio by taxing labour more heavily than capital. A
consumption tax, however, taxes the output, and therefore results in
a neutral treatment of capital and labour. This seems to suggest
that our earlier equivalences between payroll and sales taxes are
incorrect. However, this argument is misleading, since capital used
in a payroll tax system will have been subject to taxation by virtue
1 7 M.S. Feldstein, "Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation" (1974) J. Pol. Econ.
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of the labour used to construct it. Therefore the equivalence still
holds.
E. Excise Taxes
The theoretical justification for excise taxes and their use in
practice appear to be very different. In theory, selective excises can
be optimal because they can correct for externalities or selectively
tax low-elasticity products or luxuries. In fact, an extensive literature
on optimal taxation has been built up to illustrate these theories.
In practice, however, it appears that excises are used as a
means of extracting revenue from socially acceptable sources. The
heavy taxation of alcohol, tobacco, and fuels may have justifications
in the arguments of externalities and user fees, but in practice no
attempt is made to link the level of taxation with the perceived
social costs. The tax level appears to be driven by revenue
requirements more so than by economic reasoning.
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
While many of the same arguments from the closed economy
analysis can be applied to an open economy, there are also many
new considerations. In fact, a small open economy may well pursue
a strategy completely opposite to that which would be predicted for
a similar, but closed, economy. The degree of factor mobility
(labour and capital), discussed earlier in a regional context, is also
important internationally. The presence of various foreign-tax
crediting schemes is also a critical factor when determining the
desired tax mix.
In an open economy, taxes can be applied either on an origin
or a destination basis. On an origin basis, the tax is applied at the
point of production; exports leave tax-paid and imports bear no
domestic tax. On a destination basis, the tax is applied at the point
of consumption; exports leave tax-free and imports are taxed at the
border. Income taxes are an example of the former and sales taxes
an example of the latter.
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A common perception is that an economy's international
competitiveness is improved if taxes are administered on a
destination basis. Indeed, the United States has argued for many
years that the increased reliance on destination-based taxes (VAT)
by the EEC has given it an unfair trade advantage over the United
States, which has relied much more heavily on origin-based taxes.
The United States argues that EEC producers exporting to the United
States do not pay the VAT and also do not pay any U.S. taxes,
whereas U.S. producers exporting to the EEC pay both U.S. income
taxes and EEC value-added taxes. On the surface it appears to be
a tremendous advantage for EEC producers.
Economists, on the other hand, have traditionally dismissed
this line of reasoning by explaining that exchange-rate adjustments
will compensate for this apparent tax distortion and, consequently,
the basis of the tax becomes irrelevant.
1 8
A couple of additional points should be made. First,
economists have traditionally illustrated their proposition with models
where sales tax rates are uniform across all commodities. While this
simplifies the exposition, it may be misleading. In practice, tax
systems have multiple rates and, in particular, are often heavier on
manufacturing products. Hamilton and Whalley' 9 show that with
non-uniform rate taxes the basis of taxation can indeed make a
difference. They show that because of trade patterns and the
structure of these taxes, the United States may in fact be better off
having the EEC administer its VAT on a destination basis.
This further illustrates the difference between pure and
impure tax systems. For a comprehensive, uniform rate tax, the basis
may not matter at all. However, once non-uniform taxes are
considered, the picture is complicated and the correct strategy will
depend upon the pattern of imports and exports and the rate
structure and coverage of the tax.
Origin-based taxes will also be affected by the degree of
factor mobility. Just as we saw that factors of production moving
1 8 H. Shibata, "The Theory of Economic Unions: A Comparative Analysis of Customs
Unions, Free Trade Areas and Tax Unions" in C.S. Shoup, ed., Fiscal Harmonization in
Common Markets, vol. 1, Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
1 9 Hamilton & Whalley, supra, note 16.
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across regions within a country can erode a tax base, the
international mobility of these factors can influence tax policy in an
open economy.
A. Labour Mobility
Labour is clearly more mobile within a country than across
borders, although the difference may be less dramatic between
developed countries. However, there are several key factors to
remember when discussing labour mobility.
First, there is very little empirical evidence studying the
degree to which labour is mobile across borders. However, casual
empiricism suggests that for most of the population there is
effectively no mobility decision, because of immigration restrictions
and cultural differences. Most of the opportunity to cross borders
appears to come at the upper end of the income scale. Executives
for large multinationals and highly specialized professionals are
examples of the limited group of people who realistically could face
a decision regarding which country to work in.
Second, even among this mobile crowd, we often focus solely
on their personal tax considerations. Indeed, in recent years with
the popularity of analysis based on marginal tax rates, the focus is
often on the marginal personal tax rates faced by these people. This
is misleading because international labour movements are not
marginal decisions; migration decisions are all-or-nothing. These
individuals should instead consider the relative average tax burdens
in the two countries, considering the effects of the entire tax system
(sales, income, property, and other taxes). A complete model would
also consider the benefits of government expenditures. In short,
labour mobility has more to do with total fiscal burdens than with
marginal tax rates, and this differentiates the analysis of labour
taxation from that of capital taxation.
The implications for the tax mix are quite clear. If the policy
objective is to keep labour in the country, changing the tax mix is of
limited use. Lowering personal marginal tax rates and broadening
bases, while desirable for other reasons, will not typically induce
people to stay. Shifting the tax burden from personal to sales taxes
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may not have any direct effects on labour mobility because the total
tax burden will not have changed. °
Two caveats should be mentioned here. First, if individuals
suffer from some sort of tax illusion and only consider changes to
net wages, then they could move in response to personal taxes or
payroll taxes. If this is the case, then shifting the tax burden to
another source, perhaps sales taxes, could induce labour to stay.
Second, some taxes can be passed on to foreigners or capital owners.
If these taxes are increased, the total tax burden on domestic labour
will decline and this could affect mobility decisions. This is discussed
below, where we consider capital taxes.
B. Capital Mobility
The corporate tax plays an important role in an open
economy where capital is mobile across international borders.
Because most countries impose a corporate tax, the degree of capital
mobility is a very important consideration for the tax mix, especially
in the presence of foreign tax credits.
Foreign tax credits are typically part of a domestic country's
corporate tax system. Although they vary in detail, the general
thrust is to give a credit to domestic corporations for corporate taxes
paid abroad at the lesser of the domestic and foreign rates of tax on
the income. As a result, where foreign taxes are fully credited, the
relevant average corporate tax rate for a domestic firm is the
domestic rate no matter where the income is earned.21 The case of
a small open economy (Canada) will best illustrate the importance
of this for tax policy.
If capital is perfectly mobile internationally and the country
is small enough that its actions do not affect the international
market, it faces an exogenous net-of-corporate-tax rate of return on
capital. With a complete foreign tax credit, foreigners' investments
20If the mix change also results in a more efficient tax system overall, then there could
be some mobility response. Also, there could be a response to a regressive shift in the tax
burden from the higher-income groups (mobile) to the lower-income groups (immobile).
21This ignores the deferral incentive. Since domestic corporate taxes are not due until
the income is repatriated, there may be an advantage to a firm in deferring this repatriation
if the foreign tax rate is lower than the domestic rate.
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in Canada will not be affected as long as the Canadian corporate tax
rate is at or below the foreign corporate tax rate. However, if the
Canadian corporate tax rate rises above the foreign rate, Canadian
taxes cannot be fully credited and foreign investment in Canada will
decline.
This has clear implications for tax policy and the desired tax
mix. There is a built-in incentive to have a corporate tax just equal
to the corporate taxes abroad. All Canadian corporate taxes paid by
foreign corporations are, in effect, transfers from foreign treasuries
to Canada's treasury with no effects on investment behaviour. If
domestic corporate taxes are completely integrated with the personal
tax, the tax burden on domestic residents is not affected by this
corporate tax; it only affects foreign taxpayers. In one sense the
optimum share of corporate taxes is predetermined by the tax
systems in other countries. The above discussion illustrates that
factor mobility places a constraint on the revenue that a small open
country can collect from factors of production. The severity of this
restraint is an empirical matter, but it clearly exists.
This points to the importance of destination-based taxes, such
as sales taxes, for small open economies. This is especially true if
the cost or level of government services is relatively higher than in
other trading partners. In this case increasing origin-based taxes, in
response to the extra burden caused by additional government
financing costs, may simply cause factors to migrate abroad.
Consequently, increases in destination-based taxes may be more
attractive to these governments. In the Canada-U.S. context, this
suggests that reforms that increase the sales tax share and reduce
the personal and corporate income tax share could be desirable.
Again, this hinges on the degree of mobility of these factors.
VI. SUMMARY
This paper discussed a number of factors that impinge upon
the choice of an optimal tax mix. It is worth emphasizing three
observations in conclusion. First, much of the debate and discussion
in the literature relates to polar extremes of exclusive reliance on
one type if tax - usually either an income or consumption tax. In
reality, however, most countries use a mix of taxes to meet their
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revenue needs, and the arguments advanced in the literature, which
primarily discuss single-tax systems, may not be valid for marginal
changes in the tax mix. For example, while the replacement of a
personal income tax by a sales tax would clearly be a regressive
move, a partial shift from one to the other need not be so.
Second, analysis of the optimal tax mix where the taxes under
consideration are pure, textbook-style taxes, may not provide much
insight into the appropriate mix in actual tax systems. The various
components of tax systems are, in practice, impure variants of the
taxes usually analyzed. The appropriate mix of these impure taxes
is not necessarily related to the ideal mix of pure taxes.
Third, the optimal tax mix in an open economy is likely to
be quite different from that in a closed economy. In particular, for
a small open economy like that of Canada, destination-based taxes
play an important role in providing needed revenues to fund
additional government services and programmes.

